Review of International Studies has seen a debate over the value of security. At its heart this is a debate over ethics: about the extent to which security is a ÔgoodÕ and whether or not security politics produces the kind of world we want. More recent contributions focus on the extent to which security is ÔpositiveÕ or ÔnegativeÕ. However, this paper argues that the existing debate is limited and confusing: key authors use the terms ÔpositiveÕ and ÔnegativeÕ in different and at times contradictory ways. The paper clarifies the roots of the existing debate, and then draws out two different uses of the terms positive and negative: an analytic frame and a normative frame. In response, it proposes a pragmatist frame that synthesises the existing uses, drawing on pragmatism and practice-centred approaches to analyse the value of security in context. The contribution of the paper is thus twofold: it both clarifies the existing debate and suggests a solution. This is key because the debate over the value of security is crucial to thinking about how we want to live.
Introduction
Security is usually considered to be a ÔgoodÕ thing. State representatives often use it to justify and legitimise policy choices Ð if anything, security is becoming more dominant as a theme in international politics. But one of the peculiarities of the concept of security is its vagueness: it has long been recognised that Ôthe term ÒsecurityÓ covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of securityÕ 1 . It has always had contested Ð and even contradictory Ð meanings 2 . Debates over the meaning of security have suggested that it is essentially contestable by its very nature, and that the very ÔessenceÕ of security is 3 ! explicitly normative arguments about what security should be about. On the other hand, alongside this a growing number of authors emphasised the often problematic and exclusionary nature of national security politics, arguing that security is best avoided since it does not lead to desirable politics 10 . There is not enough space to detail the various contributions of critical security studies here, only to say that it has pushed research on security politics in important new directions. Although criticised for assuming there is a , centred on what kind of world we can, or even should, strive for.
But this debate is itself confusing and unclear: authors use the terms ÔpositiveÕ and ÔnegativeÕ security in different, and sometimes contradictory, ways. This paper draws together and clarifies the contemporary Ônegative/positiveÕ debate that has been ongoing in the field and featured prominently in Review of International Studies. I divide the debate into two uses of the terms negative and positive. The first use is based on an analytical understanding of positive and negative, drawing on Berlin or GaltungÕs respective distinctions between negative and positive freedom/peace. I label this the Ôanalytic frameÕ: here negative security represents an absence of threat, while positive security represents further enabling conditions for human well-being. So, in the analytic frame, negative and positive security work together to produce a more complete security. The second use is based on a normative understanding of positive and negative, and tends to draw on securitization theory. I call this the Ônormative frameÕ: it makes a normative judgement aiming to understand when security is good or bad based on various theoretical criteria. Here, negative security is seen as something ÔbadÕ to be avoided, and positive security is seen as something ÔgoodÕ to strive for. Therefore, the normative frame suggests negative security should be rejected in favour of positive security (see figure 1 below).
Analytic frame
Normative frame
Negative security Absence of threat Security in its bad form
Positive security
Security-plus Desirable/good security These frames draw on different literatures, but their differing meanings have been a source of confusion and have stalled the debate over the value of security. Although both tackle the value of security Ð adding valuable insights Ð they consider different aspects. The analytic frame analyses gradations of security and the extent to which they provide security in a meaningful sense. The normative frame, meanwhile, recognises that not all security practices are desirable and tries to understand the normative consequences of particular security practices. Both are important endeavours, but we need to recognise that in some ways they are actually different projects and dividing them into two distinct frames will hopefully encourage this. Lastly, both the analytic and normative frames focus on establishing theoretical criteria to define positive and negative as opposed to analysing how security works in practice. As a result, they do not sufficiently recognise contextual variation in the value of security.
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Having clarified the different uses of these terms, I propose an alternative approach to overcome these tensions, which I label the pragmatist frame. This brings the contributions of the analytic and normative frames together, but focuses on studying the value of security in context. Although there is not enough space to introduce a fully-fledged new theoretical framework here, the final section is devoted to exploring this further. Here I draw on the pragmatist philosophy of Dewey and James, practice-centred approaches and contextualism.
Drawing on CiutăÕs argument that security does not have an unchanging ÔessenceÕ or meaning 13 , I suggest that it also has no inherent value: this has serious implications for the negative/positive debate. If the value of security is contextual and unfixed, the focus should
shift from defining what makes security practices positive or negative in the abstract, to studying actual situated security practices in context and using this to make conclusions about the value of security in that particular case. Reflexivity is essential here: such analysis has to be accompanied by a shift from fixed normative commitments towards normative awareness.
This may in turn help practical analysis (and critique) of existing notions of security and security policy. While further research is needed to develop this, I hope this contribution will open space for exploring a new way forward for understanding the value of security.
The paperÕs central contribution is thus to clarify the debate over the value of security, drawing out the different uses of the terms ÔnegativeÕ and ÔpositiveÕ, and proposing an alternative pragmatist route. Because the focus here is on the debate over the value of security and how security is currently used, it does not tackle the bigger question of what or which issues should or shouldnÕt be constructed as security issues, as this is beyond the scope of the paper. However, studying the ethics of security implies a normative approach, where the
analyst/s is recognised as Ôactive participants in the security discussionÕ 14 . The paper begins with a discussion on the ethics of security, distinguishing between securitization and the construction of security. It then examines the negative/positive debate, drawing out the analytic and normative frames in the key contributions on the topic. Lastly, it develops the pragmatist frame drawing on these uses and building on them to create a pragmatic, contextual and practice-centred approach to the value of security. The final section discusses the implications.
Debating the ethics of security
Critical security studies emerged in the 1990s as a critique of dominant state-centred security studies and politics, to question what security is and who it is for. Most authors writing in this tradition agree that the meaning of security is constructed. Consequently, critical security studies has engaged with ideas on the value and ethics of security directly, with two of the most influential early approaches presenting contrasting views. The Copenhagen School study security as securitization, viewing security as negative and usually best avoided 15 .
Meanwhile, the Welsh School define security as emancipation, emphasising its positive value and potential
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. Alongside this, there have been ongoing debates over the referent of security, including attempts to attach normatively positive adjectives to security to overcome the negative aspects, from global security to human security, which have made important
. These perspectives have provoked growing debate over the nature, or value, of security. While it doesnÕt use the language of the negative/positive debate, the Welsh SchoolÕs understanding of security is closely aligned with the analytic frame, and is therefore discussed in more detail later. This section now turns to discuss the influence of the Copenhagen SchoolÕs securitization theory on the negative/positive security debate.
Securitization theory has played an important role in fuelling scholarship on the politics and ethics of security, and many of the contributions in the negative/positive debate explicitly use securitization as a starting point or even as shorthand for security. The Copenhagen School argue that issues ÔbecomeÕ security when a (usually elite) actor constructs them as such and this designation is accepted by the relevant audience, moving the issue out of the realm of regular democratic politics and into the realm of security where extraordinary emergency measures are enabled 18 . Securitization is seen to have Ôinevitable negative effectsÕ, including
Ôthe logic of necessity, the narrowing of choice, the empowerment of a smaller eliteÕ 19 . The
Copenhagen School argue that security cannot escape its traditional connotations because of how it is used in the field of practice: in historical terms, it is national security 20
. They view the realm of security as opposed to normal politics and based on these assumptions they argue that in most cases Ôsecurity should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politicsÕ 21 . As a result, they suggest that while securitization may sometimes be necessary most issues are best dealt with outside of the security sphere, or ÔdesecuritizedÕ
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.
The extent to which human security in particular should be considered part of critical security studies is subject to ongoing debate. There is not space to go into these debates in detail here, but a full discussion can be found in Edward Newman, "Critical Human Security Studies," Review of International Studies 36, no. 1 (2010 Consequently, securitization theory neglects security when it doesnÕt fit the framework, such as when it is framed using a different language of security that does not rely on friend/foe distinctions and non-democratic procedures. These do not enable emergency measures and are therefore not cases of securitization. Based on their definition of security, the Copenhagen School broadly favour desecuritization. However, in privileging a particular notion of ÔsecurityÕ that can only be articulated by those in a position of power, they overlook the ways in which other actors already contest dominant notions of security and threat, articulating
alternative, more positive, concepts of security 27 . The Copenhagen School struggle to see security when it does not follow their rules. Therefore, I suggest that securitization theory presents a narrow, particular understanding of security, rather than the understanding of security.
While critical approaches to security have been concerned with both the politics and ethics of security they have tended to assume security has a universal logic. , and few authors who focus on security as a state of being overlook security as a process. The different uses of the terms positive and negative matters and needs to be acknowledged, since it stalls the debate as people talk at cross purposes.
While recognising that security can be positive or negative, authors also continue to define We also need to recognise that what is good usually depends on the context: this is discussed further in the final section.
The analytic frame: an absence of threat and Ôsecurity plusÕ
The first common use of negative/positive security is based on an analytical understanding of . In the analytic frame, attaining negative security is about preventing threats from harming the wellbeing of the thing to be secured; in this sense negative security is essentially a lack, an absence of threat Ð this is why it is negative. Meanwhile, attaining positive security involves both protection from threat/s and the presence of conditions furthering active human ÔflourishingÕ of some kind. Following this approach, being truly ÔsecureÕ is not simply about being safe from threats but has to involve also advancing towards some state of the good in which one has the means for active fulfilment. Thus, the analytic frame analyses gradations of security and the extent to which they provide security in a meaningful sense. So in this usage, negative security is not seen as a Ôbad thingÕ: it is negative because it represents an absence, and is therefore limited rather See Galtung, "An Editorial," 2. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," ibid.6, no. 3 (1969): 183. 11 ! than problematic. In this sense the analytic frame has strong ties to peace research and its attempts to understand peace as more than an absence of war. . He argues that the human level has been ignored in favour of the state level and turns to sociology to argue
that Ôhuman needs encompass more than physical survival and the threats to itÕ 36 . If you define security simply as the absence of material threats to the state, McSweeney suggests, you ignore Ômuch that is relevant to a policy designed to achieve securityÕ 37 . He develops the concept of ontological security to explain what it means to be secure for human beings, emphasising the Ôsecurity of social relationsÕ relating to social order and Ôthe conditions which facilitate confidence in the predictability and routine of everyday social lifeÕ 38 .
However, external threats to the state also affect ontological security, so here positive and negative security work together to form a complete whole.
Other authors move between this notion of absence of threat/security plus and using positive and negative normatively. that this has to be protected, that this is core. And many orders, including the international order after we are no longer talking about the mere survival of a referent object. This pushes beyond the analytic frame and is discussed further in the next section.
Hoogensen Gj¿rv also uses the terms positive and negative in this way. She draws on Berlin, noting that negative security equates to ÔÒsecurity fromÓ (a threat), and positive security to Òsecurity toÓ, or enablingÕ 42 . She uses this to argue that positive and negative security can work together. She suggests that negative security tends to be associated with traditional security, whereas positive security is more useful as a critical tool to examine the gaps ignored by traditional (negative) security 43 . Here, she links negative security closely with traditional state and military actors, and positive security with non-state and non-traditional actors, which makes sense in this usage of the terms. Like Roe, she is reluctant to reject negative security, suggesting negative security can involve values of justice too 44 . She suggests that positive and negative security are conceptually distinct and involve different actors and different practices, which can be complementary. Overall, the idea of positive security as being more than a ÔlackÕ or absence of threat is key in both RoeÕs and Hoogensen
Gj¿rvÕs work. They both link negative security with survival and an absence of threat, and 14 ! often specifically with state practices (including violent practices and the use of force), and they lean towards seeing it as complementary to positive security.
From this it is clear that in the analytic frame, whether positive or negative, security is generally considered to be a good thing. Here negative and positive can be used to measure the level of security in a given situation, with negative security representing a limited version of security where you are safe from threats and positive security providing additional opportunities. Together they provide a more complete security or even emancipation.
Theoretical criteria are used to define what characterises negative and positive security, such as the actors involved, the practices they use, the values they promote, or the referent they focus on.
The normative frame: security comes in good and bad forms
The normative frame attempts to understand and analyse the normative consequences of different security practices and understandings of security. It uses positive and negative security as value judgements: here, negative security is seen as something ÔbadÕ to be avoided, and positive security is seen as something ÔgoodÕ to strive for. This category of usage is particularly tied up with securitization theory and normative critiques of securitization 45 .
Criteria are used to determine which characteristics, features or consequences define negative and positive security, respectively, based on the value judgements of the analyst (declared or otherwise). These could be attached to procedure: if particular security practices are undemocratic and I think that is a bad thing, then securitization or treating an issue as security in this way is negative from my perspective. Conversely, if other security (or even desecuritized) practices are more democratic or involve a larger number of actors, these
practices are positive from my perspective. Value judgements can also be attached to the consequences or outcomes of security/securitization. Here, security is positive if the analyst deems the consequences of security/securitization to be ÔgoodÕ, and vice versa. Roe and Hoogensen Gj¿rv both use positive and negative in this sense at times, though Floyd has a more distinct usage so her approach is dealt with separately below.
In a 2012 article on the value of the concept of securitization, Roe draws on securitization theory and its critics to suggest that security has become seen as negative because of its processes (non-democratic, fast-tracked procedures) and its outcomes (reproduction of threatdefence, friend/enemy dichotomies) 46 . Here negative security is not simply an absence of threat, but rather the presence of negative [read problematic], violent/undemocratic security practices and outcomes. He suggests this understanding of security rests on a narrow interpretation of both securitization and security, arguing that security can also be positive.
Thus while recognising that security/securitization can be ÔbadÕ, he argues that it is not as negative as securitization theory suggests, and that different, more positive or ÔgoodÕ constructions of security also exist. Here negative and positive security are defined in the normative sense.
Turning now to Hoogensen Gj¿rv, as has been noted she generally distinguishes between negative and positive security in the analytic sense, viewing the two as different but complementary. However, her association of the two terms with different actors, practices, and characteristics suggests a preference for positive security and at times suggests negative security can be problematic. In her approach, the role of actors is key Ð negative security is related to traditional militarised and state-centred security. It is hierarchical, rendering A different normative approach to judge the value of security has been developed by Floyd.
She draws directly on securitization theory and takes an explicitly normative position on the terms, defining negative security as ÔbadÕ and positive security as ÔgoodÕ, or ÔjustÕ, in her later terminology. In earlier work she uses the terms positive and negative to describe Ôhow well any given security policy addresses the insecurity in questionÕ 51 , focusing on the consequences of constructing an issue as security. Here, the value of security depends on whether there is an Ôobjective existential threatÕ and a Ôlegitimate referent objectÕ (for Floyd, 
From this, it is clear that negative security can be seen either as an Ôabsence of threatÕ, a basic condition of survival, or normatively, as the presence of conditions or practices that we should avoid. Positive security, meanwhile, can be understood either as Ôsecurity-plusÕ, an add-on to basic survival with the presence of further enabling conditions, or normatively as security in its ÔgoodÕ form which we should strive for. Both frames have merits, particularly in starting a more nuanced discussion on the value of security. However, although both address the value of security and provide useful perspectives on this important issue, the dual use of the terms positive and negative makes the debate difficult to follow. It masks the different and important contributions of the analytic and normative frames: the former allows us to conceptualise security as a good on a sliding scale, from a more limited absence of threat to a more complete security-plus. The normative frame allows us to recognise that security politics can also be bad, as noted by a range of authors in critical security studies, not least the Copenhagen School. The dual usage of the terms also makes engagement between authors more difficult, which in turn makes it hard to move the debate forward. Lastly, both the analytic and normative frames focus on establishing theoretical criteria to define positive and negative. As a result, they do not recognise contextual variation in the meaning and value of security. With the exception of Hoogensen Gj¿rv, the debate also continues the Copenhagen SchoolÕs focus on elites as the actors/speakers of security. This paper now turns to suggest an alternative that overcomes some of these tensions. It builds on the contributions of the analytic and normative frames, but focuses on studying the value of security in context. Context is mentioned by the key authors in this debate but rarely elaborated upon or taken to its logical conclusions. RoeÕs 2014 article draws on feminist . In her case however, this means looking at how security is used in practice by elite actors following specific criteria of securitization and judging the value on the outcome. Thus, existing approaches still rely on theoretical definitions as opposed to analysing how security works in context. The rest of this paper is devoted to exploring the possibility of using pragmatist, practice-centred and contextualist contributions to analyse the value of security by looking at how it is used in different contexts.
Towards a pragmatist frame
The alternative frame I propose bridges the analytic and normative frames but focuses on analysing how security is used in different contexts to gain practically useful knowledge 60 . I retain the normative use of positive and negative as good and bad respectively, to recognise that security can be problematic, but use the analytic frame to suggest that while we cannot define what characterises ÔgoodÕ or ÔbadÕ security in the abstract, the ÔgoodnessÕ of different security practices in a context should be understood on a scale rather than in binary terms. I call this the pragmatist frame, since it draws on the pragmatist philosophy of Dewey and James to shift the debate away from developing objective definitions or criteria for when security is good or bad and towards seeking practically useful knowledge about the value of 72 . In this way, we can analyse when human beings experience security as a ÔgoodÕ (and vice versa) . This shifts the discussion away from the abstract potential of security to be ÔgoodÕ or ÔbadÕ, towards empirical research analysing what it ÔdoesÕ in different contexts.
The way in which pragmatism is used here lends itself to practice-centred analysis. Practicecentred approaches study practices and how they (re)produce particular ideas and realities 73 .
Here I draw on a wider notion of practice following Adler and Pouliot, which fits more logically with pragmatism. Thus ÔpracticeÕ includes discursive practices as well as ideas, power relations, policies and physical practices undertaken in the name of security 74 . Vitally, practices are distinguished from behaviour or actions because they are Ôsocially meaningful patterns of actionÕ 75 . A wider understanding of practice allows us to study a range of security practices and processes, including contestation and resistance to dominant security practices.
This means that we can study a range of actors beyond elites, while recognising the importance of power. Pragmatism is vague on research methods but practice approaches can provide a clear toolkit for how to study security in a way that is compatible with a pragmatic approach 76 . It also gives us an empirical starting point: security practices. Simply put, we cannot and should not avoid normative judgements when we study security.
For Ciută, a Ôprescriptive observationÕ endorsing a particular concept/practice of security because it is considered to be ÒbetterÓ, Ôcannot therefore be justified analytically, but only normativelyÕ 81 . This is an important distinction. He suggests that rather than endorsing a particular version of security from an analytical perspective, which is problematic, the analyst can engage normatively by highlighting Ôthe ethical implications of different contextual definitions of securityÕ
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. Thus, he stresses a normative awareness as opposed to fixed
Bubandt, "Vernacular Security: The Politics of Feeling Safe in Global, National and Local Worlds," 291. 78 Ciută, "Security and the Problem of Context: A Hermeneutical Critique of Securitisation Theory," 314. This also raises the question of the possible dissolution of security if security can mean whatever actors want it to mean: there is not space to go into this in depth here, but Ciuta deals with it in more detail (see 2009: 320-22 24 ! normative commitments. This has important consequences for understanding the value of security. We can study actorsÕ different understandings and practices of security and what these do, considering their ethical implications in the context studied. McDonald critiques the traditional focus on the state, suggesting that if we recognise the contextual and contested nature of security we need to study how actors beyond the state use it too Ð particularly since non-state actors often contest dominant security practices. If we are trying to understand security by studying how security is used, therefore, we cannot justifiably ignore alternative voices. Most importantly, focusing just on the state reifies a particular state-centred logic of security, which is often explicitly rejected by other actors 83 .
So where do we look for security? 84 I have already suggested security practices as a starting point. Authors used here focus largely on discourse, while this paper suggests going beyond that to consider practices more broadly. Thus, at its most basic, we should start by looking at actions and habits they produce, and how they affect life experiences. In-depth case studies lend themselves most obviously to such analysis of the value of security. They are also more likely to provide situated and practically useful knowledge. BubandtÕs study of security practices in Indonesia in an excellent example here: he analyses how state and global security notions/structures are contested or absorbed at local levels, and how local notions feed back into both. While the focus in his study is on the meaning of security, the methods could be equally useful for studying its value. An analysis could study global, state and/or non-state security practices, considering both more Ôhigh profileÕ practices with a lot of influence and ¥ What effects do the practices produce?
¥ What actions and habits do they produce, and how do they affect life experiences?
¥ Are they helpful in daily struggles (the pragmatist test)?
¥ Do they protect, enable or constrain referents?
¥ What are the ethical implications of the practices studied?
This is not an exhaustive list, but it does provide a starting point. The answers to these questions will vary in different contexts. Which actors/practices are important to study will also depend on the project and case/s studied. We also need to recognise the interconnectedness of security issues
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. For example, a security practice may be helpful to the
daily struggles of some but produce insecurity for others. Thus, the wider ethical implications of the practices analysed need to be taken into consideration.
We are also left with the normative problem of which actors we choose to study: which practices do we study, whose voices do we listen to, and why? Pragmatism does not give satisfying answers to questions about power: whose daily struggles should practices be helpful to, and who gets to decide if the results of a practice are good? McDonald pursues a normative agenda drawing on emancipation, concerned with Ôlocating immanent possibilities for emancipatory changeÕ by opening space for alternative voices 87 . While I am sympathetic to this approach, it is worth remembering that alternative is not necessarily ÔbetterÕ in ethical terms: consider right-wing groups using security to advocate for closing EU borders to refugees escaping war, for example. So who do we listen to and study, and on what basis do we make this decision? In most cases and contexts studied, there will be a range of actors practicing and articulating security. Covering a range of actors will help to capture different ways of practicing security, which will then allow for more depth when we consider the ethical implications of these security practices. This doesnÕt mean all studies have to cover all actors: a study could focus on a single state, non-state groups, or one or more international organisation/s: but in each of these there will likely be some contestation, resistance and disagreement. By analysing how security is contested in different spaces, we also recognise that security is a Ôsituated interactive activityÕ 88 and needs to be understood, and studied, as such.
To give another example, Bilgic studied security in Tahrir square, focusing on how protesters experienced and practiced security during one week. He draws on feminist work to rethink . The normative commitments of the analyst will also likely vary between cases studied in contextual security analysis. For example, in my analyses of energy security practices I emphasise the connections between human well-being and environmental security, for the simple reason that without environmentally sustainable energy security practices in the longer term there will be no individual experiences, no human well-being to consider, no daily struggles to be helpful to, as the planetary ecosystems on which human survival depend will fail. What is ÔgoodÕ therefore depends on the context and what different security practices do in that context, as well as the analyst. This is why we need to be clear and open about normative commitments. Recognising the subjective and context-dependent nature of the value of security will in turn fuel and push the debate forward instead of getting gridlocked in disputes over the (im)possibility of an objectively defined ÔgoodÕ.
However, a pragmatist frame also recognises the need to keep these categories open. So how do we determine what is and isnÕt security, and thus which practices to study? The focus here is on analysing how security is used and using this to further understanding of the value of security. Thus the focus is on studying existing security practices, and what they ÔdoÕ in different empirical contexts Ð taking a broad interpretation of ÔpracticeÕ. Here I mean specifically practices undertaken in the name of security 95 . This doesn't mean security couldnÕt be something else, or that there arenÕt further things that could or should be secured which currently are not (which is crucial, but separate, question), but the focus here is on how
94 Johan Eriksson, "Observers or Advocates?," Cooperation and Conflict 34, no. 3 (1999): 327. 95 That said, this is a personal preference intended to help narrow down the number of practices studied, but it is not inconceivable that the framework could also be used to study practices that practitioners donÕt consider to be part of security.
29 ! different existing practices of ÔsecurityÕ in empirical contexts can help us understand the value of security. Here, I argue in favour of pluralism and diversity: rather than narrowing down what we mean by ÔsecurityÕ to very specific uses or particular (elite) actors, looking at a more diverse range of actors and a more diverse range of meanings of security (beyond survival), serves to illustrate that the value of security depends on the context. Security studies needs to open up for the possibility that ÔsecurityÕ can mean very different things, and that in these cases it is characterised by very different processes and outcomes.
Similarly, it is important to view the value of security in non-binary terms. Security is contested: consequently, to understand security it is necessary to study the full range of security constructions Ð from more problematic and undesirable security practices, to limited practices which secure us from threat, to more emancipatory practices, by a wide range of actors and in a range of empirical contexts, to really interrogate the value of security. In a sense this means accepting the range of existing definitions and approaches to the value of security and studying how they work in practice. 
Implications and conclusion
The value of security matters: both because problematic security practices can do a lot of harm and because ÔgoodÕ or ÔpositiveÕ security practices can help us advance towards the kind of world that we want. But the current debate over the value of security causes 31 ! confusion. This paper has clarified the debate by separating out two different ÔframesÕ used by key authors. The analytic frame draws on positive/negative liberty and peace, and thus defines negative security as the absence of threat, and positive security as added enabling possibilities beyond survival: here positive and negative security work together. The normative frame uses value judgements and deploys the terms positive and negative in a normative sense, often drawing on securitization theory. Consequently, this frame suggests that negative security is bad and to be avoided, while positive security is desirable. These frames have their roots in different literatures and although both theorise the value of security they look at different aspects, leading to somewhat different research agendas. This causes confusion and has stalled the debate. This paper has argued that the value of security depends on how it is used and what it does in different empirical contexts, developing a pragmatic framework for understanding the value of security in context. This approach allows us to recognise that security can be bad, but that it can also be something worth striving for, while avoiding imposing abstract theoretical definitions of ÔgoodÕ and ÔbadÕ. Bourne and Bulley suggest abandoning attempts to establish secure ethics, arguing that we should instead be Ôtreating moral choice as explicitly unsure, uncertain and insecureÕ 96 . Accepting this, a pragmatist frame helps us move forward with a practical research agenda that avoids defining the ÔgoodÕ in theoretical terms while allowing us to evaluate the normative implications of different existing security practices in a particular context. Thus the paper opens space for empirically grounded research on the value of security. The paper focuses on clarifying the existing debate and suggesting an alternative, so it presents a conceptual analysis rather than an empirical application. There is therefore much potential for future research on the value of security in different contexts. Beyond this, two problems not addressed by this framework come to mind as possibilities for future research.
Firstly, what about cases where some experience security as a good, but others do not? The ongoing debate over the surveillance society provides an excellent example: some experience surveillance as reassuring, while others find it an imposition on their freedom to go about their daily lives unwatched. In such cases the role of the analyst becomes much more complicated and needs to be considered in more depth. Secondly, what about those who cannot practice security? This framework is merely intended to understand the value of different existing security practices. More research is needed into the silences and gaps this creates, as it overlooks those who cannot speak or practice security but may be deeply affected by insecurity, whether this be silenced or marginalised groups or non-human elements in need of protection, such as local or global ecosystems. This paper has clarified the debate over the value of security and suggested a new framework for analysing it in context, but while it pushes the debate forward it also raises new questions. Security is powerful and contains potential for harm as well as ethical progress. But ultimately, understanding the value of security is crucial in order to move towards the kind of world that we want.
